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It so happens that the epicentre of the EU’s 
referenda earthquake – by way of its external 
impact – has now been located exactly in the 
middle of the Black Sea. Paradoxically, this 
comes at the same time that the region has 
begun to show signs of possibly getting a grip 
on itself.  
Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia were the first hit by the 
tremors. But it goes further than that, up the 
Danube basin to Belgrade,
1 across the 
Caucasus to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
last but certainly not least up to Russia. For 
all states that have been espousing long-term 
EU membership aspirations – including all 
of the above, except Russia – it is now time 
for a reality check. For Russia, which had 
not anticipated this upset in the EU, it may 
be interpreted not so much a time for a 
rethink, as an encouragement not to have a 
rethink.  
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By comparison, the Mediterranean partner 
states of the Barcelona Process are not much 
affected, because the Arab states have no 
expectations or real desire for EU 
membership. One can speculate that the EU 
and member states may make even greater 
efforts to be coherent in foreign policy to 
compensate for their internal disarray, as for 
example in the ongoing case of the EU-3 
initiative over Iran. 
 
* Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European 
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first prepared for a symposium of the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, 
D.C., 29-30 June 2005, on The United States and the 
European Union: Shaping a Common Geo-Strategy. 
This paper is published in the framework of the CEPS 
Stratagen programme (see inside back cover). 
1 Serbia-Montenegro is a member state of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC). 
But for the Black Sea and Balkan states (in different 
degrees), there is a new question of strategic 
importance. The name of the game has changed. The 
prospects of accession to the EU have moved further 
into the distance ahead, maybe beyond the horizon. 
‘Pause’ is the word being used, in a context where the 
unit of time may be a decade. Can the EU’s hugely 
successful political conditionality machine and 
gravitational powers of attraction, as evidenced in its 
recent enlargement, continue to operate with some 
variant model of virtual, functional membership? Or, if 
not, are the prospects for the deepening and 
consolidation of democracy in these regions going to 
be seriously prejudiced? 
Consequences of the Referenda 
First come Bulgaria and Romania, which have recently 
signed their treaties of accession, yet now nervously 
wait to discover whether the ratification process is still 
going to be smooth. The EU is committed to take in 
both in either 2007, or with a year’s delay in 2008 if 
some shortcomings are not rectified very fast. 
Commissioner Olli Rehn has called this the ‘yellow 
card’ treatment. The Commissioner himself rejects the 
idea that some member states might fail to ratify, and 
(thank God) all will ratify through parliamentary votes, 
and not by referenda. It remains to be seen whether the 
French or Dutch parliaments will make difficulties. The 
French prime minister Dominique de Villepin has said 
to the French national assembly that the commitment to 
Bulgaria and Romania should be honoured. The 
European Council on 16-17 June was encouraging 
towards both Bulgaria and Romania, noting that they 
will from now on participate as active observers in all 
Council and European Council meetings until 
accession day. Yet parliamentary ratification in France 
cannot be taken for granted, especially if Bulgarian and 
Romanian accession gets delayed to 2008, and the 
ratification laws were to come in the middle of the 
campaigning for the French presidential election due in 
2007.  
Second comes Turkey whose accession negotiations 
are due to begin on October 3
rd. But the Turkey factor 
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was clearly a factor in the ‘no’ votes in the French and 
Dutch referenda. In addition there is now Schroeder’s 
call for early elections to take place just days before 
October 3
rd. As of today, Mrs Merkel is likely to be the 
next Chancellor, and she rejects the idea of Turkish 
membership, favouring instead a close association 
arrangement with the code name ‘privileged 
partnership’. Moreover in France, Nicholas Sarkozy, 
who is positioned as front runner to succeed Chirac in 
2007, agrees with Mrs Merkel on Turkey. Might 
Germany renege on the opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey? Probably not, since the 
terms of the European Council’s decision of last 
December included a scenario for something like a 
privileged partnership to be the outcome of the 
negotiations should all the conditions for full 
membership not be attained. Mrs Merkel could say that 
her preferred outcome is compatible with the terms of 
reference, and therefore could agree to going ahead. 
Yet this would mean a bitterly confused start to the 
negotiations, since Turkey itself is adamantly against 
anything but full membership. The conclusions of the 
European Council of 16-17 June were ominously silent 
on Turkey.  
Third come the other Balkans states that (as a matter of 
relevance to the present paper) have joined the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC), 
including Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, with 
Macedonia as a further applicant, and whose future has 
basically to be taken as part of the Western Balkans 
question. A few weeks before the referenda, a ‘group 
of wise persons’, chaired by former Italian prime 
minister Giuliano Amato, concluded their review of the 
Balkan question with the recommendation that the EU 
firm up the accession prospects for all countries in the 
region with 2014 as the target date, symbolically 
chosen to coincide with the centenary of the Sarajevo 
assassination that triggered World War I. Without this, 
they argued, there was a risk that the Western Balkans 
would relapse into a wretched ghetto surrounded by the 
EU. If this diagnosis is correct, some new EU strategy 
will have to be found, since it now seems inconceivable 
that the EU will embrace anything like the 2014 
proposal. The European Council of 16-17 June 
concluded nonetheless with remarkably warm words 
for Macedonia and encouraging ones for Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania. It reaffirmed the 
Thessaloniki commitment for all the Balkans to find 
their future in the EU. The most charitable comment is 
that the unspecified time horizon for their membership 
is sufficiently distant that it could allow time for the 
EU to sort itself out institutionally in the meantime.  
Fourth come the ‘neighbours’, which EU official 
language uses to group Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and 
the three South Caucasus states (in addition to the 
Mediterranean partner states). In particular, Ukraine 
and Georgia in their Orange and Rose revolutions have 
announced their long-term membership aspirations, 
with precious little encouragement from the EU even 
before the referenda earthquake. Mrs Ferrero Waldner 
has been criticised for her dismissive remark earlier 
this year that for Ukraine “the door is neither open nor 
shut”. Following the referenda earthquake, many would 
say that it is not necessary to discuss whether is open or 
shut, since the conceivable time horizon is so distant. 
This means therefore a recalibration of discourse and 
expectations in Ukraine especially, with the risk that 
the staying power of the Orange revolution might be 
undermined, and with Yanukovitch and friends poised 
to decry the hollowness of Yushchenko’s European 
aspirations. This is reason enough for the EU to give 
maximum real content to the neighbourhood policy – to 
which we return below.  
Fifth and finally will be the Russian reaction. Russia 
had recently just about got round to recognising that 
the EU’s enlargement had actually happened. Its 
Europe experts were beginning to assume that all the 
European CIS states would be progressively heading in 
the same direction, for all to become ultimately EU 
member states. Russia was losing, indeed seemed to 
have lost, its European near abroad. Russia’s political 
elite had also more or less come to appreciate that 
Putin’s aggressive near abroad policy of the last few 
years had been spectacularly unsuccessful, and even 
counterproductive in pushing Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova to the West. But no policy conclusions had 
been drawn, as illustrated by the very recent actions to 
sanction Moldova in trade and commercial policy for 
not being a compliant partner. And now before they 
had time to draw conclusions, Moscow receives new 
information. The seemingly inexorable expansion of 
the EU seems to have hit a roadblock. A specimen of 
Russian reactions is the following: 
In this situation, Russia has a window of 
opportunity. Contrary to the EU with its 
antagonisms between member countries, Russia 
exercises sole political will. Russia offers its 
neighbours concrete and lucrative economic 
projects rather than hopes for integration in the 
distant future. Meanwhile Russia demands much 
less in return from its neighbours. On the contrary, 
each step of European integration, even the most 
preliminary, is accompanied by a massive number 
of economic and political conditions. Therefore, 
after the wave of ‘colour’ revolutions, the 
pendulum might sway in the opposite direction. 
Labourites in Georgia, progressive Socialists in 
Ukraine, and the Rodina movement in Moldova, 
those who strongly support integration with Russia, 
might get their chance.
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Also on EU-Russia relations, while at the summit level 
documents on four common spaces have been signed in 
May, independent analysts on both sides are skeptical 
and consistent in their assessments. This was seen in a 
recent report of a large group of Russia’s leading 
experts on European affairs:  
The larger part of the experts (65%) believes that 
Russia would gain from a technical pause (not a 
freeze) in its relations with the European Union. 
This pause could be used to rethink and mend 
negative aspects of the present format of bilateral 
relations. A pause is needed because the Russian 
economy and businesses are unprepared for closer 
relations with the EU. The Russian business 
community and even the government lack enough 
knowledge about EU mechanisms, while the 
Russian state does not defend domestic businesses 
from pressure of rival businesses and bureaucracy 
of the EU. … Moreover the work of the ‘four 
common spaces’ would only create the false 
impression of progress in bilateral relations and 
would thus undermine stimuli for creating and 
implementing specific projects.
3  
This view is rather consistent my comments at about 
the same time: 
The four common spaces are indeed a 
manifestation of the ‘proliferation of the fuzzy’. 
They represent the outermost extension of the EU’s 
internal logic. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy, which Russia does not want to be covered 
by, is itself a weak and fuzzy derivative of the 
EU’s enlargement process. This neighbourhood 
policy is embracing the same comprehensive 
agenda of the EU’s internal policy competences 
and political values, but without the mega-
incentive of accession. The four common spaces 
are now a weaker and fuzzier still derivative of the 
neighbourhood policy, giving only token attention 
to democracy and excluding explicit reference to 
EU norms as the reference for EU-Russia 
convergence.
4
Our conference programme document asks where the 
EU’s expansion ‘can or must stop’, or how it may 
manage the dilemma ‘between stability export and 
overstretch’. It seems that more answers have been 
delivered than expected in the time since that note was 
drafted. The EU’s expansion has almost come to a stop 
(only Bulgaria and Romania are likely maybe to get 
through in the foreseeable future), and the hazard of 
 
3 “Russia-EU Relations: The Present Situation and 
Prospects”, report of a group of experts chaired by Sergei 
Karaganov and published as CEPS Working Document No. 
225, July 2005. 
4 Michael Emerson, EU-Russia – Four Common Spaces and 
the Proliferation of the Fuzzy, CEPS Policy Brief No. 71, 
May 2005. 
overstretch is taking priority over stability export. This 
is not the preference of all the member states, but the 
unanimity rule for enlargement means that the 
preference apparently revealed in two referenda 
becomes binding. Interestingly the ‘pause’ word seems 
to echo also on both sides of the EU-Russia 
relationship too, which has to be more than a 
coincidence.  
But will concern for the possible negative impact on 
the aspiring neighbours reach high enough up the 
agenda of EU leaders for the risks to be addressed? 
One must be doubtful as of now, until we receive 
information to the contrary. The primary rifts in EU 
politics today are multiple and deep: between the left 
and right on social and market policies, between those 
favouring more or less Europe institutionally, between 
those of more Atlanticist versus Gaullist priorities in 
foreign policy, between those wanting to continue or 
stop the enlargement process, and not to forget the 
current unholy row over money. These cleavages are 
themselves quite reasonable, they are the normal stuff 
of politics. But the sharpness of the debates brought 
about by the referenda campaign seems to be 
consuming all energies. Could Prodi’s ‘everything but 
the institutions’ be an option to mitigate the 
disappointment of would-be accession candidates? The 
answer actually is yes, and this becomes rather obvious 
to see, as long as eyes are opened to look beyond the 
EU’s frontier.  
In summary, the EU governments reaffirm their 
commitments to Bulgaria and Romania, whose Treaties 
of Accession have been signed, yet ratification by the 
French parliament cannot be taken for granted. For 
other candidates or would-be candidates, the general 
message is ‘pause’. The EU will not renounce its 
political declarations envisaging that all the Balkans 
will become full members in the long-run, but the time 
perspective will be beyond the political horizon. For 
Turkey negotiations may still open in October, but they 
are already framed with alternative outcomes. For the 
Western CIS states, some of whom have been looking 
for political declarations about their membership 
prospects, such language will be out of the question for 
the time being.  
New Tendencies in the Black Sea Region 
The paradox is that this has been happening at a time 
when the states of the region have begun to get their act 
together. In February 2005, four new EU member 
states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) joined 
with Bulgaria and Romania to found a ‘new friends of 
Georgia’ club, which they even called the Baltic-Black 
Sea axis. Saakashvili and Yushchenko have been 
concerting together as if blood brothers. The GUAM 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) summit 
of May 2005 in Chisinau saw the beginnings of a new 4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
regional politics and diplomacy. They decided that a 
GUAM Mark II should be reconstituted to comprise 
only states of the region that were seriously interested 
in democracy. Uzbekistan did not attend. The successor 
organization shall have a new name along the lines 
Democracy and Development Organization. Ukraine 
was mandated to make a proposal (but about which we 
have not yet heard more since). Ukraine begins to 
assert itself as a key centre of diplomatic initiative, 
seeking to complete a huge set of circles of regional 
cooperation in which it is always present: old BSEC, 
new GUAM, ‘4+1’ with the Visegrad countries, 
trilaterals with Ukraine-Moldova-Romania and 
Ukraine-Poland-Lithuania, not to forget old CIS and 
the newer Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan. 
Romania too, with Captain Basescu as its new 
president, with its NATO membership achieved and 
EU membership in sight, seems attracted to promoting 
more assertively the idea of Black Sea cooperation. 
The role model of Finland in relation to its Northern 
Dimension initiative of the 1990s seems to have rung a 
bell in Bucharest. This has been only one of several 
examples of the familiar process whereby with EU 
expansion the new member state transposes its own 
regional foreign policy preferences into EU policy.  
Could it be that the newly revolutionary states of the 
region will now exhibit together a democratic 
momentum that is sufficiently robust to resist being 
undermined by the receding lure of EU membership? It 
seems possible to sketch a new phase in the post-
communist democratic transition. In the period 1991 to 
2004, there was a sharp differentiation between the EU 
accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the European CIS states. The EU candidates 
became deeply engaged in the EU conditionality 
process. The conditionality was real and became 
credible. For example Slovakia fell behind so seriously 
with the Meciar regime that it almost lost its place on 
the first accession train. Bulgaria and Romania were 
relegated to the second accession train, and even now 
face the prospect of a further year’s penalty delay for 
accession. The message got home. There is a 
recognisable standard for real democracy, while there 
is also a recognisable category of phoney democracies. 
This became the neat distinction between the accession 
candidates and the non-candidates of the European CIS 
region. In the last year, however, the new real 
democracies acceded to the EU and also became the 
EU’s new frontier states, and with Ukraine in 
particular. At about that time Georgia decided that it 
had had enough of phoney democracy and the new 
revolutionary episode began: Georgia, Ukraine, and 
then even Kyrghizstan, and then tragically the Andijan 
massacre in Uzbekistan. Maybe we are witnessing 
another one of those pan-European revolutionary 
episodes with manifest contagion: 1789, 1848, 1989-
91, and now 2004-05. Perhaps the democratic 
transformation of the EU’s new member states has 
already served as diffuse inspiration for democratic 
reform in the wider neighbourhood, even without the 
mechanics of EU candidature.  
Four Strategic Questions on the Agenda 
1.  What are the risks of eroding or reversing the 
convergence of these states on European values, 
first of all democracy? 
While the new situation will cause disappointment and 
bitterness in Turkey, its democracy is probably no 
longer at risk. Turkey seems to have ratcheted itself up 
to a higher quality and maturity of its democracy these 
last years, with the important leverage of EU political 
conditionality. Turkish society has taken over. It is 
democratic and does not want to stop being so. This 
view may be plausible, but it is not rock solid. One 
may point to the still-fragile monetary/public debt 
situation, and speculate that a new financial crisis could 
lead to renewed political instability. For the Western 
Balkans, there are continuing pleas coming from 
politicians experienced in the region that dangerous 
scenarios should be expected in a regional ghetto of 
semi-failed states. For the Western CIS states, also the 
Orange and Rose revolutions are still fragile and 
incomplete, even if there seem to have been decisive 
breaks in the mindsets, expectations and demands of 
the population in these countries. Something of a 
ratchet effect seems to have happened there too. It is 
certainly the case that the Orange and Rose revolutions 
were driven by domestic politics. Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova are candidates for following in the 
manner of the Rose and Orange revolutions, and 
Moldova and Armenian societies are especially 
sensitive to the idea of ‘joining Europe’. EU did 
nothing to encourage the Rose and Orange revolutions, 
except for the fundamental point that it had moved its 
frontiers massively to the East, but this movement is 
now on ‘pause’. To this one can add the likelihood that 
Russia will feel newly emboldened in its near abroad 
policy, just as it had begun to concede that they had 
lost their periphery.  
Overall it is difficult to judge where the balance is most 
likely to fall in the spectrum between two polar views: 
that the region’s democratic transition is put at renewed 
risk versus the view that it has recently acquired a 
renewed and irreversible (ratchet effect) momentum. 
This very fluidity is of course an invitation to action. 
2.  Could the EU upgrade its neighbourhood policies 
to compensate for the receding accession 
prospects? 
One consequence of the referenda earthquake is that 
the air should be cleared of illusions disseminated by THE BLACK SEA AS EPICENTRE OF THE AFTERSHOCKS OF THE EU’S EARTHQUAKE | 5 
 
                                                
some leaders in the neighbourhood. But could the EU 
upgrade its neighbourhood policy now to mitigate 
disappointment, and increase its policy conditionality 
leverage compared to the policy so far, even if this has 
to remain lower-powered than the leverage of 
accession prospects? The answer to this could be 
affirmative, if the Commission and member states put 
their minds to it. The instruments of a powerful policy 
exist, since they are basically the instruments of the 
EU’s existing internal policies. The EU has already 
opened up a set of association models, some of which 
have strong content, notably the EEA + Schengen 
model for Norway, with the more selective Swiss 
variant also of interest.
5 What is needed now is for the 
Commission to prepare a comprehensive set of White 
(or Green) Papers detailing the range of options for the 
partner states to associate with EU policies. Romano 
Prodi’s slogan ‘everything but the institutions’ may be 
a starting reference. The annex to this paper sketches in 
some detail what this could mean, proposing seven 
common European policy spaces, grouped under three 
major headings:
6
I.  Political and human 
1.  Democracy and human rights 
2.  Education 
II.  Economic 
3.  Macroeconomics 
4.  Market economics 
5.  Networks 
III. Security  
6.  Justice and home affairs 
7.  External security 
The neighbourhood Action Plans set out huge agendas 
for convergence on EU norms and standards. But the 
Commission has so far neglected to present even the 
sketch of a cost-benefit analysis of which parts of its 
stock of laws and policies (‘acquis’) warrant priority 
application by associate states, and which parts they 
can better set aside. The Commission should now 
produce a set of White or Green Papers to explain for 
each of the relevant policy domains what the 
possibilities are, analysing their potential costs and 
benefits for application for different categories of 
 
                                                
5 Norway through its membership of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) is fully compliant with EU internal market law 
and has full market access; it is also a member of the 
Schengen area for the movement of persons and visa 
policies. Switzerland is largely but not fully a member of the 
EU internal market, and in June decided by referendum to 
join the Schengen area.  
6 For a detailed presentation, see M. Emerson, The Wider 
Europe Matrix, CEPS, 2004; and for an updated account, 
European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy of Placebo, 
CEPS Working Paper No. 215, November 2004 (available at 
http:// shop.ceps.be).  
partner state, depending on their economic structures 
and level of development.  
The essence would be for the EU to make an open-
ended offer of ‘functional membership’ as and when 
the partner state is ready. This would mean going as far 
as inclusion in various policies and in some cases 
almost all policies, but without a vote in the legislative 
and decision-making institutions of the EU. Actually 
the EU is already saying this in general terms, but the 
headlong plunge by the Commission into producing 
bilateral Action Plans for individual partner states has 
left the policy side of the matrix underspecified. Full 
‘political membership’ would be deferred until the 
EU’s political and institutional absorptive capacity was 
ready for it. Norway offers the model of a non-member 
state’s full inclusion in most EU policies, together with 
a fully democratic preference to remain outside the 
institutions. That most other neighbours are not at 
Norway’s level of development is obvious, but that is 
not the point, which is rather to note that the EU retains 
an extremely elastic continuum of degrees of functional 
inclusion in its policies – even as the full membership 
issue is becoming increasingly difficult.  
If the content of the policy were seriously reinforced 
(as suggested in more detail in the annex), the EU 
should in the new situation go an important symbolic 
step further and change the name. The term 
Neighbourhood Policy would never have been adopted 
if the partner states has been consulted. As a choice of 
brand name, it has proved to be a categorical mistake, 
since the partner states read it as being exclusionary, 
cold and condescending. What might be the 
alternative? One obvious candidate could be ‘European 
Integration Policy’, since that corresponds to the terms 
widely used in the governments of the partner states 
themselves. It conveys an inclusive, dynamic and 
forward-looking message.
7
3. What could be the role of a renewed Black Sea 
regionalism?  
Regionalism in the present context means the 
organization of cooperative activity in a natural 
geographic-historical region of states that find 
themselves on different sides of some important 
political divides. This is the regionalism of the 
European neighbourhood, which attempts to bridge the 
primary divides with the states of the CIS to the north 
and east, and of the Arab world to the south. This 
 
7 This would be used especially for the European partner 
states, whereas the southern partner states already have the 
heavily branded Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or 
Barcelona Process). For the Mediterranean the current 
neighbourhood policy is only adding a bilateral dimension to 
this pre-existing policy. Yet much confusion is created, and 
time taken in explaining that the neighbourhood policy is an 
additional layer of Barcelona policy and not a replacement.  6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
                                                
regionalism has both low politics and high politics. The 
low politics concern the technicalities of, for example, 
common transport and environmental concerns, and 
questions of border crossings and local government 
cooperation, of organising youth and sport activities, of 
combating cross-border crime, etc. The high politics of 
this regionalism have been described as a unique blend 
of security and integration strategies, in which partial 
integration across the natural region – notwithstanding 
the primary political divides – fosters a common sense 
of regional trust, values and identity, and so allows 
soft-security models to displace hard-security 
concerns.
8
The EU has invested heavily in this regionalism in the 
Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, with the Northern 
Dimension initiative and the Barcelona Process. Lip 
service is given to regionalism in the EU’s new 
neighbourhood policy, but the accent there is 
nonetheless on bilateralism. The Black Sea has so far 
been the only natural region of the EU’s periphery to 
have been ignored.
9 This is starting to change now, 
with the imminence of Bulgarian and Romanian 
accession. The current Greek presidency of the BSEC 
organization has wanted to push for a Black Sea 
Dimension initiative, but this does not seem to have 
taken off. However an additional impetus seems to 
emerge in Romania, which begins to contemplate a 
Black Sea role that draws inspiration from Finland’s 
role in the Northern Dimension, and Bulgaria would 
surely want to join in this (with just a hint of brotherly 
competition as seen between Finland and Sweden). The 
Commission is of course aware of this normal post-
enlargement EU dynamic, and begins to inscribe the 
words Black Sea into its neighbourhood policy 
documents more freely. The new neighbourhood 
financial instrument is explicitly designed to serve the 
purposes of neighbourhood regionalism, to facilitate 
cross-regional initiatives with a single instrument.  
If the moment for a new impetus for Black Sea 
regionalism seems to have come, it remains to be 
determined who will take the diplomatic initiative, and 
which organizational route might be taken as between 
several options: a) re-animate the semi-dormant BSEC 
with an infusion of resources from the EU, b) back the 
emerging GUAM Mark II, for which Kiev has not yet 
delivered its promised proposal, and which would be 
for ‘democracies only’, excluding Russia for the time 
 
8 Fabrizio Tassinari, “Mare Europaeum: Baltic Sea Region 
Security and Cooperation from post-Wall to post-
Enlargement Europe”, Institute of Political Science, 
University of Copenhagen, 2004.  
9 A comprehensive account of Black Sea cooperative 
initiatives to date is given by Mustafa Aydin in “Europe’s 
New Region: The Black Sea in the Wider Europe 
Neighbourhood”,  Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2005.  
being, c) an EU-Black Sea Dimension, d) a NATO-
Black Sea Dimension or e) some new developments 
built on all or several of the preceding four options.  
While the presumption in favour of enhanced Black 
Sea cooperation is now strong, it is far from obvious 
how a fresh initiative might most plausibly be initiated. 
There is a complex set of political jealousies inhibiting 
too much leadership from any of the big players – 
Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, EU, NATO or US. Even 
Ukraine, which has no negatives to its historical 
balance sheet, cannot be too pushy without upsetting 
Turkey, which is not in GUAM. 
Some years ago, BSEC invited the EU to become an 
observer, which it declined, although it may now be 
persuaded to take a more positive view. More recently, 
however, Russia has been saying to BSEC high 
officials that active EU involvement would not be 
welcome. BSEC has also recently declined the offer by 
the US to become an observer of BSEC, which does 
not yet have a reply.  
Maybe the line of least resistance would call for 
Bulgaria and Romania – as new member states (setting 
aside for the moment the remaining uncertainties over 
their accession) – to propose to the EU to co-sponsor a 
fresh initiative that might be called the Black Sea 
Forum. This would draw on the experiences of 
Finland’s Northern Dimension initiative and the Balkan 
Stability Pact. Bulgaria and Romania would first form 
a determined alliance to be the initiators. As part of the 
initiating lobby, they might seek to co-opt Greece as 
the only pre-existing EU member state in BSEC, and 
Turkey as a founding state of BSEC and an EU 
candidate state. Following the Finnish Northern 
Dimension model, they would seek to get the EU to 
join in the initiative. The first act would be a 
conference of a Black Sea Forum, to which the 
Bulgaria and Romania with the EU would invite all 
BSEC member states, the BSEC secretary general and 
the United States. The EU would make an up-front 
offer of financial resources from the New 
Neighbourhood Financial Instrument, which is 
currently being finalised in Brussels, and which is 
being designed explicitly to solve the procedural-
bureaucratic problems of supporting projects that cut 
across regions with states falling into different political 
categories for the EU (member states, accession 
candidates, neighbours, etc.). The EU would thus not 
be proposing to become a member of BSEC, but would 
be offering a Forum in which BSEC and its member 
states could submit ideas and projects of regional 
interest that could make use of extra resources from the 
EU or US. In this respect, it would also draw on 
Northern Dimension experience, which did not take 
over or displace the pre-existing Baltic or Barents Sea 
organizations, but offered them an enhanced political 
framework for their activities. It would draw on the THE BLACK SEA AS EPICENTRE OF THE AFTERSHOCKS OF THE EU’S EARTHQUAKE | 7 
 
                                                
Balkan Stability Act model in including the US. 
Following a first meeting of the Black Sea Forum, the 
EU Commission would draw up a Black Sea Action 
Plan in the framework of its neighbourhood policy. The 
Black Sea Forum might meet with some regularity, 
without becoming institutionalised. Technical work on 
various sectors of policy or projects would be followed 
up in groups of the most interested parties or other 
network arrangements.  
A final political question is whether Russia would join 
in such an initiative. According to past experience, 
Russia will initially express its scepticism or hostility. 
However, when the invitations go out for the first 
meeting of the Black Sea Forum, it might become 
apparent that all the invitees except Russia were 
accepting, and then Russia would come along too.  
4. What about the US and NATO?  
President’s Bush’s visit to Tbilisi in May was an 
eloquent testimony to the effectiveness of US 
diplomacy as a morale booster for democratic spirits in 
the region – whatever one’s views are about his 
leadership on other accounts. Already in Turkey voices 
can be heard saying that the US should be looked to 
again as a primary source of political support, whereas 
a year ago the EU had been moving into the primary 
position. The same argument may be valid for Ukraine, 
although here there is still ample room for an upgrade 
in the EU relationship. 
The same logic applies for NATO, which however is 
anxiously looking for its role in the northern suburbs of 
Brussels. In the new situation with diminished EU 
enlargement prospects, NATO has an opportunity to do 
something of great political value, namely to help 
anchor the most interested neighbourhood states – 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia for the time being – 
into the Euro-Atlantic community. The range of 
cooperative activities between NATO and its 
neighbours has been developing abundantly.
10 Even in 
the Black Sea there are now going to be cooperative 
naval operations under the ‘Active Endeavour’ 
initiative, which was initially just a Mediterranean 
affair. More fundamental of course is the NATO 
accession question. Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty states: “No European democratic country whose 
admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will 
 
10 A thorough report on “NATO’s Role in the NIS Area” has 
recently been published by the Centre for Eastern Studies, 
Warsaw, May 2005.  
be excluded from consideration [for an accession 
invitation by the Allies]”. Full accession has to be 
prepared by Membership Action Plans (MAP). NATO 
accession is certainly subject to conditions, but these 
are much simpler and less demanding than with the 
EU. Is there a risk that NATO would, like the EU, run 
the risk of over-expansion, making itself 
dysfunctional? To a degree yes, and many member 
states are concerned to digest the last NATO 
enlargements still, but the risks are less forbidding than 
for the EU. On the strictly operational military side, the 
US has already amply demonstrated that it can easily, 
and even prefers to, undertake military actions on a 
‘coalition of the willing’ basis. On the other hand, the 
political value of NATO in Eastern Europe can be very 
vivid.  
Conclusions 
1. The EU’s referendum crisis has worrying 
implications for all Black Sea littoral state that have 
either short- or long-term aspirations to join the EU, 
which means the whole of the Black Sea region except 
Russia.  
2. It may be speculated whether, where or how far the 
Europeanising transformation of some states of the 
region may, as a result, be undermined. Such risks 
should not be exaggerated, nor dismissed.  
3. But in any case, the EU could and should upgrade its 
neighbourhood policy to reduce these risks. The 
strengthening of its content should be accompanied by 
a re-branding of the policy, scrapping the 
condescending ‘neighbourhood’ name, to become 
instead ‘European Integration Policy’. 
4. Moreover, the time has come for some new Black 
Sea regional initiative. The issue is not so much 
whether, but how, given well-known political 
sensitivities. A line of least resistance might be for 
Bulgaria and Romania as newly acceding EU member 
states to co-sponsor with the EU an invitation to all 
Black Sea states, the BSEC chair in office and 
secretary general, and the US to a Black Sea Forum.  
5. US bilateral activity in the region will doubtless be 
vigorous. Prospects for NATO membership for 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova could and should be 
advanced.  8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Annex 
How to Upgrade the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
The Commission should prepare White (or Green) Papers for each of the seven policy spaces, detailing the options 
as regards degrees of alignment/inclusion in EU policies, and the associated costs and benefits for different 
categories of associate states; i.e. while focusing on the ENP partners, this should draw on the experience of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). 
1. Democracy & human rights. No problem with the norms for European neighbours. All are members of the 
Council of Europe and the Court of Human Rights. The EU could further its cooperation with the Council of Europe, 
co-funding a wide range of training programmes for civil society, media freedoms, judiciary and penal systems and 
offering constitutional advice, etc.  
2. Education. Valuable progress has been made in bringing neighbours into the Erasmus and Tempus programmes, 
inter alia, for student scholarships and exchanges; also in ‘Bologna process’ for harmonising and mutually 
recognising academic standards. These programmes should be fully resourced and are an unquestionable priority. 
3. Macroeconomics. The Maastricht criteria are useful benchmarks for public deficits and debt for all. The EU can 
contribute macro-financial assistance in co-financing and coordination of conditionality with the IMF.  
4. Market economics. One of the major tasks is to translate vague ideas such as ‘a stake in the internal market’ and 
‘deeper integration’ into operational detail. This requires that the Commission takes the lead in a) promoting trade 
policy liberalisation (free trade and customs union options) and b) working through the acquis for goods, services, 
labour and capital markets, analysing the costs and benefits of compliance by neighbourhood states for each 
important line of policy action. This requires a special effort of policy analysis and definition first of all by the 
Commission, since compliance is voluntary for neighbourhood partners, unlike for accession candidates for whom it 
is mandatory. Choice among complex options requires good information, which today is inadequately available, 
especially for governments with weak staff resources. Recommended plans of action for given sectors (such as 
financial and transport services) need to arrive at an optimal blend of EU acquis compliance and ‘Washington 
consensus’ policies, in turn requiring close coordination with the World Bank, as well as the EBRD and the EIB.  
5. Networks. Progress is being made in the planning and implementation of pan-European transport and energy 
infrastructures, but with priority so far given to financing the extension of networks east into the new member states. 
The extension of core networks into neighbourhood states needs now to be upgraded, and to some extent this is 
happening (e.g. for electricity networks in southeast Europe). The resource of the EIB should be made as fully 
available for the Black Sea neighbourhood states as for the Mediterranean.  
6. Justice and home affairs. The Commission should produce operational guidelines for what partner states have to 
do in relation to the hierarchy of degrees of openness for the movement of persons: visa-free status, less restrictive 
migration conditions, completely free movement and access to the labour market.  
7. External security. The EU is making progress in forming Rapid Reaction Capabilities, Battle Groups and civilian 
peace-keeping and enforcement capabilities (gendarmerie, police, judicial, etc.) and in designating special 
representatives for conflict zones, notably in Black Sea area. However it has so far been timid in deploying these 
capabilities in such cases as Transnistria and the South Caucasus.  
Regional dimensions. The Action Plans of the ENP are essentially bilateral, which is not a problem for the 
Mediterranean where the pre-existing Barcelona Process has the means to pursue possibilities at the regional or sub-
regional level. However the Black Sea lacks this regional dimension, which should be rectified, with the 
Commission to produce a ‘Black Sea Action Plan’. 
Incentives. The EU has substantial incentives to offer (freedom of movement for goods, services and people; grants 
and loan finance; inclusion in EU policies). Yet these have not yet been put together in a clear, conditional incentive 
package. There is scope for obtaining stronger synergies with coordination of EU grant funding with loan/investment 
finance from the EIB, the World Bank and the EBRD and associated conditionalities. Hints at positive political 
conditionality in Commission policy documents are not yet clear and credible.  THE BLACK SEA AS EPICENTRE OF THE AFTERSHOCKS OF THE EU’S EARTHQUAKE | 9 
 
Institutions. Contrary to Prodi’s ‘everything but institutions’ slogan, there are considerable possibilities for partial 
and progressive institutional inclusion, which is already starting to happen with various EU agencies, and could be 
extended for consultative bodies. A Green Paper exploring possibilities should be prepared by the Commission. 
While associate status implies of course being an outsider for main policy-making at the EU level, it is not so evident 
that the populations of neighbourhood states consider a seat in the EU Council of Ministers as their vital need, 
compared to functional advantages for the movement of persons and economic integration.  
Policy Handbook. The Action Plans of the ENP already illustrate the comprehensive range of policy domains that 
are agreed by the partners to be relevant, as also confirmed by what is summarised above. The set of White or Green 
Papers recommended here should later be consolidated into a Neighbourhood Policy Handbook, whose purpose 
would be first to ensure coherence across the many departments of the Commission in elaborating their various 
elements of neighbourhood policy, and secondly to provide an adequate information base for the partner states. The 
Commission has not yet tried to lay out what this would mean. But it could now do this, acting within the powers 
that it already has. The task could be much more straightforward than the several ‘missions impossible’ that it has 
otherwise tried to undertake (e.g. Lisbon Process). The Handbook should be regularly updated. 
Re-branding into ‘European Integration Policy’. The term ‘neighbourhood’ should be scrapped, since it is 
perceived as condescending by the partner states and it fails to convey a constructive message.  
  
  
 
 
 
Stratagen - Strategic Agenda for the Greater European Neighbourhood 
A Programme of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), for 2005-2010 
 
Stratagen  mission statement 
•  To define a vision for a Wider European order and the relationship between the enlarged EU 
and its Arab/Muslim neighbourhood; 
•  To develop these proposals in-depth and in policy-operational terms;  
•  To combine in-house research capacity with networks of individuals from leading research 
institutes in the EU and the neighbourhood, and to disseminate and advocate proposals 
throughout the region; 
•  To work independently from the EU institutions but in close interaction with them; and 
•  To decide on the sequencing and selection of priority topics with core stakeholders. 
Over the last five years, CEPS has developed an exceptional expertise in European Union policies 
in the area often called the Wider Europe. This has been reflected in publications that have been 
both regional and thematic: CEPS Plan for the Balkans (1999), Stability Pact for the Caucasus 
(2000), The Elephant and the Bear – EU, Russia and their Near Abroads (2001), Cyprus as 
Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean (2002), Norway, the European Economic Area and the 
European Union (2002), Europe’s Black Sea Dimension (2002), The Rubic Cube of the Greater 
Middle East (2003), The Wider Europe Matrix (2004),  Economic Transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe (2004), Europeanisation and Conflict Resolution (2004), Readings in European 
Security, Vols. I (2002) and II (2004). These publications and related working papers are 
available from the CEPS’ on-line bookshop, at http://shop.ceps.be 
CEPS has decided to build on and strengthen its work in this broad area through the Stratagen 
programme over the five-year period 2005-2010. The rationale for this initiative follows from 
both the EU’s historic enlargement on 1 May 2004, which now leads the EU to define a new 
neighbourhood policy, and the unprecedented turmoil in the Middle East in the aftermath of 
September 11
th and the Iraq war, with its consequences for transatlantic relations. 
The Stratagen programme will be organised under the following broad geographic areas:   
•  Northern neighbourhood policy, covering CIS states targeted by EU neighbourhood policy 
•  EU-Russian relations 
•  Southern neighbourhood policy, covering Mediterranean states, but reaching also into what is 
now officially called the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) 
•  Implications for transatlantic relations will be considered for all three regions above. 
The analytical methodology will be multi-disciplinary: political science, international relations 
and European studies, economics and law.   
The programme is led by Michael Emerson, CEPS Senior Research Fellow, together with Daniel 
Gros, CEPS Director. CEPS gratefully acknowledges financial support for the  Stratagen 
programme from the Open Society Institute and the Compagnia di San Paolo.  
C  E 
P  S 
CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN 
POLICY 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
www.ceps.be ▪ info@ceps.be 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 
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